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The original purpose of the investigation described in this paper was
largely descriptive. General disturbances in economic activity can
hardlhe understood until they have been identified in time and space
with some particularity. During what periods, in each of the major
industrial countries, was the growth of business enterprise interrupted?
Were sonic of tIre interruptions brief and mild, while others were severe
and protracted? \Vhat of the intervening expansions? For answers to
such questions, many economic activities should l)e examined.The
activities of transport enterprises and their customers must rankhigh
on an' list. Railways have played acentral part in modern economic
development. They carry almost everything that industry produces,
and their freight traffic is therefore a broad if rough measureof indus-
trial production. Railway .statistics for Britain before WorldWar I are
especially valuable because direct measures of industrialproduction in
that period are very limited.
The railway data confirm, in an approximate manner,the Burns-
Mitchell chronology. Cycles in railway traffic correspondin a general
wa with the cycles that,according to the chronology, occurred in
business at large. Even when traffic did not decline in thebusiness con-
tractions, its rate of growth was retarded.
Some investigators of businesscycles have been fascinated by the
thought that they were dealing with aphenomenon of regularly recur-
ring frequency and magnitude. Aglance at the railway traffic data in
Table 6 should leave any readerskeptical of simple periodic theories.
Either there is no tendency towardperiodicity, or the effects of that
tendency are deeply buried among theeffects of non-periodic influ-
ences, or severaldifferent periodicities arc concurrently andcomplexly
interwoven.
The various aspects of economiclife differ greatly in degree of dis-
97turhaiicc. Passenger traffic is less variable than freight U aflic;the latter
is more stable than product ion of steel. ( hanges in thecomposition of
freight traffic provide additional evdcnce that Illictuationsinhiral)te
goo(ls industries are more severe than those in other industries.
We have described the operations of British railways in fairlyinten..
sive detail from 1 919 to 1952. In 9 of thcsc 34 years thcand the British
economy at large were directly affected by war or by great strikeswith
very general consequences. To what extent should we draw(llSt1flctjfl5
between the cycles in which these cvents figured andother cycles? The
railway operating concomitants of the traffic chaiigcsinthe 1921 and
1926 strikes were different from the operatingconcomitants of other
fluctuations in traffic. The 1926 strikeInay have (lislocated thesequelice
of prosperity and depression for severalyears; the annual reference
chronology for Britain is curiouslout of step with the chronologyfor
the United States from 1925 to 1 928. Hereis meat for those wholike
problems of definition.
Notation of features like those briefly mentionedin the preceding
paragraphs is part of the descriptive task. Livelyminds will riot he
content with descriptions, but will wishto know why generaleconomic
disturbances occur, and whysome arc more violent or prolongedthan
others. Strikes and wars explainsome characteristics of some distur-
bances, hut they do notobviously explain a cycle like1879-86 or
1932-38. Transportationdata alone will hardly provideexplanations. But they neverthelesshave some relevance to variouslines of thought
along which the problemhas been approached.
In recent years there has beenmuch discussion of the stimulating
effects that are supposedto flow from an increase inexpenditures on
plant, equipment, and inventories.Under favorable circumstances,the
increase of investment is believedto induce a niuch larger increaseof
expenditure on goods forconsumption, There isa "multiplier" cfl'ect
on employment and presumablyon the volume of traffic offered for
transportation, On the other hand,one can readily imagine circum-
stances under which theincrement of investmentwill express itself
primarily in an inflationof prices. In weighingsuch possibilities it
seems pertinent to note thatan increase in railway trafficwill Or(lirmarilv
be accompanied bya less than proportionate increasein railway em-
ployment and purchases,and that the situationin sone other indus-
tries is probably similar.Conversely, influencesdepressing traffic will
98have a less than proportionate depressing effect on employment.
Railway profits, on the other hand. increase and decrease out of
IoP00fl to tiaflic and revenues. In the UnitedStates, during thc
good vcars of the interwar period, the railroad companies used large
portions of their 1)rOfitS to finance improvements in plant and equip-
ment. Presumably the manner in which investment isfinanced has
something to do with its impact on the national economy. British rail-
ways appropriated virtually all earnings for payments tosecurity holders
(Table 38) . Their rather nioclest capital expenditures were financed
from other sources than earnings.
The British railway compaines did, however, follow a systemof
operating expenditure that was potentially countercyclical.In some
years they spent more, especiallyfor maintenance, than they charged
against current revenue, charging the balance to"renewal'' or "sus-
pense'' accounts. In other years they charged greater sumsagainst
revenue than they actually spent.The counterc clical effect was not
very regular in practice. The maxinlufli excessof total cx1)eliClitllre over
the sum regarded as attributable to the currentvolume of traffic did
not always occur in a trough year.The minimum excess, or the maxi-
niurn postponement ofexpenditure, did not always occur in a peak
year. In any case, the amountsinvolved were small.
While sonic analysts of cycles haveoccupied themselves with the
effect of investment on sales, others haveconcerned thcmsclvcs with
the effect of sales on investment.In particular, it has been supposed
that all increase in the physicalvolume of business necessitates an
increase in the stock of equipmentused to handle that business. Applied
to periods no longer than abusiness expansion, this idea finds little
support in railway operatingexperience. British railways handle con-
siderable increases in their trafficlargely by keeping their equipment
in use more of the time. Stocksof equipment sometimes diminished
during an expansion of traffic.Over longer periods the idea has more
validity. The tremendouscumulative growth of traffic during the nine-
teenth and early twentiethcenturies could not have been caredfor
without a great accumulation ofequipment. Since 1920 increases in
traffic during business expansionshave been almost offset or more than
offset by decreases duringcontractions, and stocks of equipment have
also increased very little orhave gradually declined.
Business men increase or diminishtheir current investment expendi-
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1932 Trough 27.2 28.8 28.7 105.9 10 1943 29.6 30.8 30.7 101.1 l0),7-IS 1934 32.3 33.1 3:1.0 11)2,5 02.2 1.2 19.15 33.7 .14.3 101.3 11)1.8 -LI 196 36.5 36.-! 36.5 99,7 11)1),)) 4.5 1937 Peak 38.7 38.2 38.3 98.7 99 0 .6 1938Tr'1i 29.8 29.9 3ft1 100,3 101.1) ],
Amount appropriatedplus any decre1sor minus any inereasu- inthe Isalanru. sheet accounts, "Unpid interestand dividends" and''Interest and dividendspayable or accruing and provided for."
E.cess of operatingexpenditures marieover rJperating expcndittirec;licd against gross receipts of theyear, in the incomeaccount A ncgativfigure means thateprn- diturs madewere less than expenditurescharged acainstrcceiptc, Outlayson other operations as well as railwayOperations were includedin COfl)ptItjg thesefiguires,
tures from time to timefor reasonsother than thecurretit level of their sales or therecent direction of changein saks.Consuniers likewisevar their expendituresforreasons other than the1-ecent level or trciul of theirflCOIIICS.To a largeextent these otherreasons center around the
100emergence, illIprOveiflent, cheapening, and glowing availabilityof new
objects of expenditure, especially those of a durable character. It is a
sale bet, for example, that more pcol)le with incomes of about$4000
bought television sets in 1949 than in 1948. When the motives for
increasing Cx1)Cflditure prevail over those for diminishing it,businesS
at large is likcly to CxJ)afld ; when the predominance isthe other way
around, it is likely to contract. In the nineteenth century, developments
in transport opened vast new prospects of expenditure.Promoters and
investors saw prospects of profits from buildingrailroads. Merchants
and manufacturers visualized a means of broadeningtheir markets.
Consumers found travel more inviting. In our own century, motor
transport has largely taken over the role formerly1)laycd by the railroads.
When depressive influences preponderate overstimulating influ-
ences, many of the latter maynevertheless continue to operate and,
when reinforced by new impulses, may help turnthe tide again. Such
influences can sometimes be identified from thecyclical pattern of the
data. When consumers rapidly increase theiroutlays on a particular
object of expenditure during business expansion,and diminish their
outlays very little or not at all during businesscontraction, one may
fairly infer that the "propensity" tospend for that object is rising. The
propensity for motoring rose in Britainthroughout the intersvar period;
the number of cars in uscincreased in every contraction. (The propen-
sity for motor-cycling declined, atleast after 1927On the business
side, the number of motor trucksregistered likewise increased continu-
ously. These influences showthemselves also in the consumption of
motor fuel, the annualsupply of which increased from year to yearin
every mterwarcontraction, except for a slight clipfroni 1924- to 1925
anti from 1930 to 1931.
When the British government enteredthe war, it provided an obvi-
ous instance of anincrease in spending promptedby something other
than an increase in thereceipts of the spender. In anindustrially pow-
erful and uninvadeci country, warhas many effects like thoseof other
economic stimulants. Largequantities of goods anti large numbersof
men had to bemoved ; there was an unusually greatboom in railway
traffic. Centralized controlof transport facilities aridrouting, and the
tolerance of congestion onpassenger trains,accenttiatc(l the railroads'
usual ability to handlegrowing traffic without proportionate expanion
of employment orstocks of equipment. The conveyanceof di.iabic
101S
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goods and of niaterials for making themdOUl)tICSS irlcrcasp(lfastet' than other ficight traffic. The finaluses, iiaturallv, were differcm
War construction and mimit ions;we have seen how t he rfliJ!)t(lS
thCJIIseive had to curtail ordinary maintenance.
Peace brought a new kind ofstimulus. Therewasa rush to hulong unavailable durable goods. andto resume othereXJ)crl(littties thathad bCCU discouraged. 1hc railwayscndeavorcd to makeup for ncglect
maintcnancc. Owners of motorvehiclesquicklyrestored themto dr- culation, booming the market forcommodities associatedwith theirtj Such impulses of reconversionmusteventuallyfade, ofcourse future business expansionmust depend on other andperhaps lessread iJ' idem. tifiable stimulants.
1 Thiswas difficult. As late as 1949we find the Railway Exccutjv
cornpJajjpthat "the shortage of materials governs the rate at whicharrears of rent'walscan he overtaken"